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ZONING LAW
I. COURT LIMITS DISCRETIONARY POWERS OF BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
In Colbert v. Krawcheck1 the South Carolina Supreme Court es-
tablished the proper standards for a board of adjustment to use when
it approves or denies an application for the adjustment of boundary
lines. These standards did not exist in the Charleston Zoning Ordi-
nance (Ordinance) prior to this decision.2 In Colbert the court upheld
and extended the holding of Stevenson v. Board of Adjustment of
Charleston,3 which limited the discretionary power of the board to
grant variances and prohibited it to make determinations based on
standards that are not prescribed by the local ordinances and zoning
standards.
4
Mrs. Colbert, the Petitioner, filed an application to adjust certain
boundary lines with the Charleston Board of Adjustment (Board). Sec-
tion 54-48(a) of the Ordinance grants jurisdiction to the Board and
states that "[a]ny owner, agent or developer who proposes to adjust the
boundary lines between any area. . . shall submit detailed plans...
to the Board of Adjustment created under this chapter and no such
adjusted boundary lines shall be platted of record. . . unless the board
shall have approved the aforesaid adjustment .... ."' The Ordinance
establishes no further standards or criteria to approve lot line adjust-
ments beyond this grant of power.
The Board denied the application and used its discretionary power
because no standard existed in the Ordinance. The Board determined
that the standards used to grant a variance were applicable, and that
the petitioner's application did not meet the requirements. Therefore,
the application had to be denied. The trial court affirmed the Board's
decision and found that the variance standards were the appropriate
measure of review. The court of appeals, however, did not consider the
merits of the case and affirmed on the ground that Colbert did not
properly appeal the use of variance standards.8
The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Mrs. Colbert's peti-
tion for certiorari. The supreme court disposed of the procedural bar
1. 299 S.C. 299, 384 S.E.2d 710 (1989).
2. Id. at 304, 384 S.E.2d at 713.
3. 230 S.C. 440, 96 S.E.2d 456 (1957).
4. Id. at 448, 96 SE.2d at 460.
5. CHARLESTON, S.C., ZONING ORDINANCE § 54-48(a)(1986).
6. Colbert, 299 S.C. at 302, 384 S.E.2d at 712.
1
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and held that the record properly preserved the standards issue.7 The
supreme court also reversed the court of appeals' decision, and held
that the Board erred when it applied the variance standards, and that
the proper standard to use to adjust a lot line is found in section 54-55
of the Charleston Zoning Ordinance.' The language of section 54-2 de-
fines a variance as "[r]elief from the literal enforcement of this Chap-
ter, permitting the use of property in a manner otherwise forbidden
.... ,, Thus, a variance is used only when the applicant's request
does not comply with a zoning ordinance. The court stressed that in
Colbert neither the requested adjustment of lines nor the resulting lots
would have violated any ordinance, and fully complied with zoning
standards.10 The court, therefore, found that the variance standards
were inapplicable, and directed the Board to apply the standards for
new lot creation, which set forth all requirements for footage and street
access.
11
The court indirectly relied on Stevenson v. Board of Adjustment
of Charleston,"2 which ruled on the Board's abuse of discretion in
granting a variance, and limited its discretionary power.13 "In exercis-
ing its discretion, the board of adjustment is not left free to make any
determination whatever that appeals to it's sense of justice. It must
abide by and comply with the standard prescribed by the local ordi-
nance and zoning statutes."' 4 In effect, the supreme court in Colbert
extended this discretionary limitation concept to apply to situations in
which specific standards do not exist when it required the Board to
utilize the standards that are most closely designed to meet the needs
of the request, as opposed to those standards the Board arbitrarily de-
termines to use. The supreme court portrayed the Board as self-serving
when Justice Toal admonished it for ruling capriciously and arbitrarily
as a direct result of the pressure exerted on it by Colbert's neighbors,
who opposed the proposed changes.' 5 The Board's improper motiva-
tion, however, ultimately did not influence the outcome of the case.
Rather, the court applied a common-sense interpretation to an unam-
biguous ordinance.
The court's decision in Colbert has a dual effect on state zoning
law. In a narrow sense, the court has created new standards to govern
7. Id. at 303, 384 S.E.2d at 712.
8. Id. at 303-04, 384 S.E.2d at 712-13.
9. CHARLESTON, S.C., ZONING ORDINANCE § 54-2 (1986).
10. 299 S.C. at 304, 384 S.E.2d at 713.
11. Id., 384 S.E.2d at 712-13.
12. 230 S.C. 440, 96 S.E.2d 456 (1957).
13. Id. at 448, 96 S.E.2d at 460.
14. Id.
15. Colbert, 299 S.C. at 304, 384 S.E.2d at 713.
[Vol. 42
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [], Art. 19
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol42/iss1/19
ZONING LAW
an application for the adjustment of boundary lines and these determi-
nations will no longer be governed by the standards used to grant a
variance. In a broader sense, however, Colbert limits the Board's dis-
cretionary application of standards and when no specific standard ex-
ists, requires the Board to apply those standards that most closely suit
the particular request.
Kelley M. Braithwaite
II. PLANNING COMMISSION AND COUNTY COUNCIL MUST COMPLY WITH
ZONING ORDINANCE WHEN MAKING ZONING DECISIONS
In Turner v. Barber"6 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
a planning commission may not recommend approval of a Planned
Unit Development (PUD)17 that does not comply with the county zon-
ing ordinance."8 The Richland County zoning ordinance requires all
PUD applications to contain a generalized drawing and a descriptive
statement before the planning commission can recommend the rezon-
ing plan for approval to the county council. The court held that the
commission's recommendation to the council was "fatally flawed" with-
out the descriptive statement."
Universal Associates (Universal) applied to have a 100 acre tract
of land rezoned as a PUD. Under the county zoning ordinance, each
PUD application must have a General Development Plan that consists
of a drawing and a descriptive statement. When Universal submitted
its application to the planning commission, however, the application
did not include a descriptive statement. Despite the omission, the com-
mission recommended the plan for approval. Universal subsequently
submitted the descriptive statement to the county council, and the
county council approved the rezoning plan after the third reading."
Prior to the third reading, a group of homeowners challenged the
suffiency of Universal's PUD descriptive statement. The homeowners
claimed that the statement did not include the information required
by the county ordinance. Following approval by the county council, the
16. 298 S.C. 321, 380 S.E.2d 811 (1989).
17. "The intent of planned unit development districts is to derive the benefits of
efficiency, economy, and flexibility by encouraging unified development of large sites,
while also obtaining ... optimum service by community facilities. . . ." Id. at 322 n.1,
380 S.E.2d at 811 n.1 (citing RICHLAND COUNTY, S.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES, app. A, § 6-
10.1 (1983)).
18. Id. at 324, 380 S.E.2d at 812-13.
19. Id. at 323, 380 S.E.2d at 812.
20. Id. at 322-23, 380 S.E.2d at 811-12.
1990]"-
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homeowners challenged the decision in the Richland County Circuit
Court. The circuit court upheld the council's approval of the plan. The
homeowners then appealed to the supreme court the circuit court's or-
der that upheld the rezoning ordinance. 21
In their appeal,-the homeowners argued that the commission and
county council should have been required to comply with the county
zoning ordinances; a presumption of validity should not attach to un-
reasonable and unlawful zoning decisions; and rezoning specific parcels
of land should be considered a quasi-judicial rather than a legislative
act.
22
Universal argued that its failure to comply with the zoning ordi-
nance was a technical defect similar to the defect at issue in Smith v.
Georgetown County Council.2 3 In Smith property owners sought to set
aside an amendment to a county zoning ordinance that allowed a de-
veloper to zone a 140 acre tract into a PUD. As in Turner, the Smith
PUD's conceptual plan failed to provide certain information required
by the ordinance.24 Despite a lack of the requisite information, the
South Carolina Court of Appeals ruled that both the planning commis-
sion and the county council had enough conceptual information about
the plan for it to comply with the zoning ordinance.2 5 In Turner, how-
ever, Universal did not give the planning commission the essential in-
formation that the Richland Council zoning ordinance required. Ac-
cording to the supreme court, the omission in Turner presented a more
significant defect than the omission in Smith.28
Under South Carolina law, zoning decisions are legislative acts
and, therefore, are presumably valid. Unless an act by a municipal
body is arbitrary, unreasonable, or an obvious abuse of discretion,
courts generally will not disturb the municipality's act on appeal.28
Only when an ordinance is so unreasonable that it impairs a citizen's
constitutional rights will courts question the validity of the govern-
21. Id.
22. Brief of Appellant at iv.
23. 292 S.C. 235, 355 S.E.2d 864 (Ct. App. 1987).
24. Id. at 238, 355 S.E.2d at 866. (plan did not contain information on drainage,
contours, location of flood and marsh prone areas, and density).
25. Id. at 238-39, 355 S.E.2d at 866.
26. 298 S.C. at 324, 380 S.E.2d at 812.
27. Rushing v. City of Greenville, 265 S.C. 285, 288, 217 S.E.2d 797, 799 (1975);
Rush v. City of Greenville, 246 S.C. 268, 276, 143 S.E.2d 527, 531 (1965); Bob Jones
Univ. v. City of Greenville, 243 S.C. 351, 360, 133 S.E.2d 843, 847 (1963), appeal dis-
missed, 378 U.S. 581 (1964).
28. Bob Jones Univ., 243 S.C. at 359, 133 S.E.2d at 847; Talbot v. Myrtle Beach
Bd. of Adjustment, 222 S.C. 165, 169, 72 S.E.2d 66, 68 (1952). See Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
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ment regulation.29 In Turner the supreme court ruled that the omis-
sion of a descriptive statement of the PUD violated the county zoning
ordinance and, therefore, the circuit court abused its discretion when it
upheld the county's approval of the plan.3"
The supreme court reversed the circuit court based on the home-
owners' first two arguments. The planning commission and county
council failed to comply with the county zoning ordinance and, there-
fore, the court concluded that their acceptance of the PUD plan was
unreasonable and unlawful.3 The court resolved the issue in Turner
without addressing the homeowners' third argument which questioned
the validity of a legislative approach to rezoning and which suggested
the adoption of a quasi-judicial approach.
The South Carolina Court of Appeals, however, has addressed this
issue. In Hampton v. Richland County32 the court of appeals refused
to classify municipal rezoning decisions as quasi-judicial. The court
held that the rezoning "like an ordinance adopting a comprehensive
zoning plan, is legislation, pure and simple."' 3 3 The court of appeals
expressly rejected the quasi-judicial approach to rezoning, which is
known as the Fasano doctrine.
34
In Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners35 the Oregon Su-
preme Court held that land use planning or rezoning decisions about
single tracts of land, rather than a whole city, are more like quasi-judi-
cial decisions than legislative decisions.36 In characterizing land use de-
cisions as quasi-judicial acts, the Oregon court attempted to counter
the pressures of private economic interests and enlarge the scope of
review for decisions made by municipal zoning bodies. The Oregon
court adopted a quasi-judicial approach to rezoning to achieve a more
efficient and fair system of land use decision making.37 Rezoning deci-
sions by local authorities have a significant impact on land values, and
local zoning bodies often rely on unstated land use policies to arrive at
their decisions. Furthermore, when a board rezones a single tract of
29. James v. City of Greenville, 227 S.C. 565, 585, 88 S.E.2d 661, 671 (1955).
30. Turner, 298 S.C. at 323, 380 S.E.2d at 812 (1989); see also Renney v. Dobbs
House, 275 S.C. 562, 564, 274 S.E.2d 290, 291 (1981) (abuse of discretion arises in cases
in which the judge was controlled by error of law).
31. Turner, 298 S.C. at 324, 380 S.E.2d at 812-13.
32. 292 S.C. 500, 357 S.E.2d 463 (Ct. App. 1987), cert. dismissed, 296 S.C. 72, 370
S.E.2d 714 (1988).
33. Id. at 507, 357 S.E.2d at 467.
34. Id. at 506, 357 S.E.2d at 466-67.
35. 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23, (1973) (partial overruling recognized by Norvell v.
Portland Metro. Area Local Gov't Boundary Comm'n, 43 Or. App. 849, 604 P.2d 896
(1979)).
36. Id. at 587, 507 P.2d at 29.
37. Id. at 588, 507 P.2d at 30.
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land, it can neglect individual rights because of the informal proce-
dures used in the decision-making process. The combination of these
factors poses a threat to the due process rights of the individuals who
seek a zoning change.3 8 In City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,
Inc." the United States Supreme Court considered due process re-
quirements in the context of a legislative zoning decision. The Court
upheld an Ohio zoning procedure that permitted ezoning decisions by
referendum. The majority found no due process violation in the Ohio
ordinance. The Supreme Court deferred to the Ohio Supreme Court's
interpretation of rezoning as a legislative act.4"
More recently, the Fifth Circuit held that decisions that affect
zoning variances are presumed valid if the determination has a rational
basis.4 1 Although the Fifth Circuit recognized an increased property in-
terest in variance requests, the interest was not sufficient to trigger in-
dividual due process protections. According to the court, a state's use
of a quasi-judicial approach does not, by itself, raise due process is-
sues.4 2 Some courts, including the court of appeals in Hampton, have
expressed concern about the judicial burden that would result from the
increased procedural safeguards.43 South Carolina aligns itself with the
majority of states that continue to use a legislative approach for zoning
decisions.
44
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court has not directly ad-
dressed the issue, the adoption of a quasi-judicial approach most no-
ticeably would affect the procedural safeguards required in land use
decisions.45 The concerned parties in zoning decisions would have the
right to notice, the right to be represented by counsel, the right to
cross-examine witnesses, and the right to have the proceedings re-
corded. The Fasano decision also suggested reviews for ex parte con-
tacts with zoning board members, conflicts of interest, and other biases
to ensure impartial decisionmaking. Because of the increased attention
to procedural safeguards, a number of legal scholars and courts find
38. Comment, Zoning Amendments - The Product of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial
Action, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 130, 131-32 (1972).
39. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
40. Id. at 674. A distinction exists between decisions that affect comprehensive
zoning plans and zoning for specific parcels, and a quasi-judicial scheme affords greater
procedural safeguards for those individuals who request zoning changes for specific par-
cels. Id. at 683-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41. Shelton v. City of College Station, 780 F.2d 475 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 477
U.S. 905, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 822 (1986).
42. See id. at 478-79.
43. See Shortlidge, The "Fasano Doctrine": Land Use Decisions as Quasi-Judicial
Acts, 1985 INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING AND EMINENT DOMAIN.
44. Id. § 3.03[5], at 3-40.
45. Id. § 3.03[2], at 3-27 to 3-33.
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the quasi-judicial approach an appealing solution to the due process
threats in rezoning decisions.46
In Turner v. Barber the South Carolina Supreme Court applied
the established test for zoning decisions. The court achieved a Fasano-
like result without expressly commenting on the quasi-judicial ap-
proach. The quasi-judicial scheme proposed in Fasano offers a reasona-
ble safeguard for due process rights in single tract rezoning decisions
and may one day be accepted in South Carolina.
Lucinda Gardner Wichmann
46. Id. § 3.02, at 3-33.
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